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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/
Respondent,
REPLY ERIEF OF APPELLANT

vs

Case No. 890272-CA

ONAN FORD,
Defendant/
Appe11ant.

Cateqory No. 2

JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This is the Reply Brief of Appellant filed pursuant to
Rule 24(c), Rules of the Utah Court of Appeals.

ARGUMENT
Point One
TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO
QUASH THE LINEUP.
The State cites the case of State v. Wettstein, 501
P.2d 1084 (Utah, 1972), which recited several factors which
should be considered in evaluatinq the validity of an
identification procedure.

Defendant arques that at least two of

the six factors cited therein were not present in this case, and
therefore the We 11 s t e i n case contains further basis to have
quashed the lineup.

Number two of the factors, as cited in the

State's brief is, "Was there a necessity for usinq the type of
identification employee?" anc number thice was, ''Were the

circumstances of an urqent character?'
Takinq the factors iii reverse order and applyinq them
to the lineup procedure CoJL^ndant was subjected to, there were
certainly no circumstances of an urqent nature which required an
immediate show-up.

Officer Phillips of the Oqden City Police

Department was in charqe 01 the procedures,

in answer to the

question, "Would it have had any harm in your mind to have
delayed this just ionq enouch to calx an attorney to come down?"
Officer Phillips responded, 'As iar as the case, 1 can't see that
it would have harmed anythinq...." (R. 829). based upon Officer
Phillips1 own statements, tnui,: were not urqent or exiqent
circumstances existinq in this case.

Without such, the State was

not justified in proceedinq witn the "show-up."

The fact that

the police were busy should not prejudice the Defendant by
withhoidinq from him n q h t s to which he is entitled pursuant to
statute and the Constitution; i.e., the riqht for counsel to be
present at any lineup.
The State's arquruent chat it was necessary to use a
show-up procedure is qroundiess.

Tne Defendant was in the

custody of the police ana the witness was a local resident, who
could have been called back at any time to attempt to make an
identification at a properly arranqed lineup.

The Defendant

requGstea several times for representation of an attorney (R.
788/ 79C, 791, 805), which requests should have been immediately
qran tea bat which were denied.
The State also a^qL.es

that the witness who identified

the Defendant had ample opportunity tc view the Defendant face to
face in a liqhted store, and that such fact supports the use of a
show-up procedure instead of a lineup.

However, when the witness

observed the robber, he had on a qreen jacKet, a scarf up over
his mouth, and a hat that was down over his forehead, revealinq
only the nose and eyes of the Defendant (R. 323-324).
of ciochmq

Such items

were found by police oflicers in this bushes at some

time previous to Defendant's apprehension (R. 364). Therefore,
the State's arqument that the witness viewed Deienaant under
circumstances in which he could observe his dress and features is
simply inaccurate.

When the Defendant was viewed by the victim

durinq the identification process, Defendant wab wearinq
different clothmq

than the robber wai observed wearinq by the

witness in the store.
The State further arques thui Detendant was qiven the
benefit of the doubt by havinq two other Black males included in
the show-up.

However, just because they are Black does not mean

they were similar in appearance to each other.

One, in fact, was

quite a bit liqhter in color, almost yellow-skinned, and short,
with an Afro (R. 802 and 8 0 6 ) , which dij not resemble either of
the other two individuals in any wuy.

Surely, a lineup should

not be structured such that the witness1 attention is directed to
a particular witness.
The law as cited in Appellant1s Brief provides that, "A
suspect has the riqht to have an attorney present at any lineup,
either before or after arrest,"

Utah Code Ann. J77-8-2 (1980),
- 6-

and further that the entire procedure should be recorded, Utah
Code Ann. 77-8-4 (1980).

To deviate rrom the requirements of law

is a violation 01 Defenuant's riqhts, particularly in a case
where there is no qooc reason to have violated such riqhts.
There were no exiqent circumstances requirinq anychinq less than
providinq Defendant with all 01 his riqhts, and to allow the
State to deviate from the requirements on the basis that such was
merely a show-up and therefore chat the law does not apply, has
the effect of unnecessarily woakinq the law ana violatinq
Defendant's riqhts.

Accordingly, this Court should conclude

that because of the seriously flawed nature of the lineup
procedures, the case should be reversed and remanded for a new
trial, and an order entered suppressing all tainted evidence.

Point Two

TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO
DISMISS DUE TO PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT.
The state cites three cases, State v. Lafferty, 749
P.2d 1239 (Utah, 1988); State v. Knight, 734 P.2d 913 (Utah,
1987) , and State v. Fontana, 680 P.2d 1C42 (Utah, 1984) , as
supportinq its arqument that no supposed error or defect has
occurred; that no substantial riqht of the Defendant has been
violated, ano that thereLore the errors attributed to the State
in this case should be disregarded as harmless error.
A review of the State's cited Cuses, however, reveals
cases with facts that, are irrelevant in anaiyzinq the facts in

the present case.

The Laf fer iv case, supra, dealt with problems

created by tne prosecutor in making erroneous statements in his
openinq statement and statements which were allegedly improper
assertions of fact and expressions of opinion in his ciosinq
argument.

The court in Laf for t.y, supra,

founo no error in

either the prosecutor's opening statement nor his ciosinq
argument.

Lafferty, supra, at 1254-1256.
In the case of State v. Knight, supra, the Utah Supreme

Court reversed a conviction based on the prosecution's failure to
disclose discovery to which the Defendant was entitled.

State v.

Knight, supra.
Finally, in the case of State v. Tontana, supra, the
court affirmed a conviction of Second Degree Murder over
Defenoant's appeal based on a claim that an error m
of jury instructions had occurred.
11

the giving

The court in Fontana held,

...that there is no reasonable likelihood that a depraved

indifference instruction that included an express treatment of
the knowledge element would have produced a more favorable result
for the defendant.

Consequently, any error in that instruction

was not prejudicial ana cannot serve as a basis lor reversal.11
Fontana, supra, at 1049.
None of the State's cases dealt with improper contact
with a Defendant by prosecutors and police.
In the present case, the State has committed
indiscretions far in excess of mere improprieties in opening or
closing arguments or ot arguing an improper, though not
-8-

prejudicial, jury ihstf ucticn.

in fact, the State* s actions in

this case qo further than the case of the state failinq to
provide discoverable evidence, which case was reversed by the
Utah Supreme Court .

State v. Knight, supra.

The Defendant in this case has been prejudiced in that
his constitutional due process and equal protection riqhts have
been violated.

The Fifth Amendment to i;he Constitution of the

United States states that no person shall be '"'...deprived of
life, liberty, c. property without cue process or law "

The

Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States
states that no person within its jurisdiction shall be "...denied
equal protection of the laws."
The Sixth Amendment tc the United States Constitution
reads, in part, as follows:
"In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall...have
the assistance of counsel for his defense."
This Defendant has been subjected to the overwheiminq
resources and power of the state without the advice of counsel in
effectinq a plea neqotiation with officers of the state.
In a case cited in ^ppoiiant's Lriei, Santobello v. New
York, 404 U.S. 237, 92 S.Ct. 495, 30 L.Ed.2d 427 (1971), the
United States Supreme Court, in discussinq plea barqainmq,
stated :
"The disposition of criminal charqes by agreement
between the prosecutor and the accusec, sometimes
loosely called ! piea bargaining,' is an essential
component of the administration of justice. Properly
administered, it is to be ^ncouraqed . If every
criminal charge were suojecteo to a full-scale trial,
tne state ana the federal government would need to
-9-

multiply by many times the number ot judqes and court
facilities.
"Disposition of charges after plea discussions is not
only an essential part of the process, but a hiqhly
desirable part for many reasons..." Santobello v. New
York, 30 L.Ld.2c, at 432.
Due to the lact that the State of Utah is attemptinq to
take this Defendant's liberty from him, the Defendant should
certainly be accorded due process and equal protection of the
laws.

In that the law allows him to have the assistance of

counsel when defenuinq himself aqainst criminal charqes and
inasmuch as the Defendant had retained defense counsel, part of
the due process and c\uul protection of the ±aws afforded to the
Defendant should be the utilization of his retained counsel.
The Washinqtoii State Supreme Court, in the case of
State v. Swindell, 607 P.2d S52, stated:
"The presence of counsel durinq all staqes of plea
barqaininq is mandated by the courts. In Bordenki rcher
v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 363; 98 S.Ct. 663, 668; 54
L.ED. 2d 204 (1978), the U. S. Supreme Court noted,
f
plea barqaininq rlows from the "mutuality of
advantaqe" to defendants ano prosecutors, each with his
own reasons for wantinq to avoid trial. Brady v.
United States, 397 U.S. 742. at 752; 90 S.Ct/l463,
1474; 25 L.Ed.2d 747 (1970). Detendants advised by
competent counsel and protected by other procedural
safequards are presumptively capable of intelliqent
choice and response to prosecutorial persuasion and
unlikely to be driven to false self-condemnation.'
Further, in Williams v. Kaiser, 323 U.S. 471, 475-76;
65 S.Ct. 363, 36b; 89 L.Ed. 398 (1945), the court
stated, 'Only counse. could discern from the facts
whether a plea of not quilty to the offense charqe or a
plea ot quilty to a lesser charqe would be appropriate.
A layman is usually no match for the skilled prosecutor
whom he confronts in the courtroom. He needs the aid
of counsel, lest he be the victim of over zealous
prosecutors of the law's complexity or of his own
iqnorance or Lev* l iderinont. ' "
-10-

In the present case, thouqh Defendant contacted state
officials to seek out a plea negotiation, the State was clearly
wronq in pursuing discussions with the Derencant without
involving his attorney.

Once the discussions ensueci and the

proposed bargain was offered ty police officers and
representatives of the county attorney's office, Defendant made a
request two or three times to be allowed to consult with his
counsel, Merlin Calver, which requests were denied,

(R. 719-7 21,

attached hereto as part of tiv_- addendum.)
The State wants to minimize the effect of what, happened
in this case, claiming thac Mr. Calver, Defendant's retained
attorney, entered the case after Defendant?s preliminary hearing
and had "simply filed several pre-trial motions," presumably
suggesting that Mr. Calver hau not done enough to justify
standinq as Defendant's attorney.

There is no question that Mr.

Calver was Defendant's attorney and that Mr. Calver should have
been involved in the plea discussions between the State and the
Defendant.
The State suqqests that the prosecutor at the trial was
"shielded" from any knowledge or information disclosed in the
sting operation.

Though the record admittedly reflects testimony

supporting such claim, as noted in the State's brief, it is
impossible to know what really takes place in a small county
attorney's office, particularly when the prosecutor involved in
the case, Gary Heward, was one

ol the prosecutors who made direct

contact with the Defendant without Defendant's counsel being

present (R. 663-667) and helped in making decisions involved in
the furtherance of the plea bargain through contact with the
detectives involved in the case, with the detectives acting as
middle men in communications involving the Defendant and the
prosecutor's office (R. 667-669).

Mr. Heward also stated that he

was well aware of the fact that the Defendant had an attorney in
this matter (R. 669).
Further prejudice arguably occurred in that, as part of
the plea negotiation, Defendant made tapea admissions involving
his own charge in order to further the plea bargain he had agreed
to.

Though there are claims by the State that this information

was not utilized, there is no way of knowing what effect Mr.
Ford's statements had on the State's case and what holes, if any,
his statements in the case may have plugged.

Though the State

denies the possibility of a better plea bargain, it is unknown
what an attorney, thiough plea negotiations, could have obtained
for this Defendant.

In essence, his right to plea bargain a

better deal than he was able to negotiate for himself has been
permanently denied to him.

Simply remanding the case for a new

trial would be useless, in that any defense attorney working on
Defendant's case is rendered, to some degree, useless.
Accordingly, this Court should conclude that the pre-trial
irregularities which occurred were prejudicial and illegal.

-12-

CONCLUSION
Based upon the foreqomq, Appellant requests that
Defendant's conviction be reversed, and the case be dismissed or
in the alternative that he be qranted a new trial with an order
that all tainted evidence be suppressed.
Respectfully submitted this Q ^ day of September,
1989.

ROBERT L. TROLRER
Attorney for Appellant
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
1 hereby certify that on the f/tjx day of September,
1969, 1 mailed, postaqe prepaid, four true and correct copies of
the foreqoinq REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT to Dan R. Larsen,
Assistant Attorney General, 236 State Capitoal, Salt Lake City,
Utah 84114.

ihktjd^
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ADDENDUM

1

A

No, that isn't-

For him to go over this

2 thoroughly with me, it would have tooken more than, as Reed
3 Richards and Heward says, three minutes.
4
5
6

No, he didn't go

into detail anything about this agreement with me.
Q

Do you consider yourself to be bright,

intelligent?

7

A

I never have.

8

Q

Did you graduate from high school?

9

A

No.

10

Q

How far did you go in school?

11

A

I dropped out in the 7th.

12

Q

7th grade.

Did you ever request an attorney be

13 present to advise you as to whether this was a good
14 negotiation or not?
15

A

Twice, I think three times.

16 twice I know of.

I'm not sure, but

And I did this once in the jail with Lucas

17 and Soakai standing there.

I said, well, let me think about

18 it for a minute here, and I think I should call Merlin Calver
19 and talk to him and see what he thinks.

Merlin Calver

20 shouldn't know anything about this right now.
21

Q

Who said that?

22

A

This is coming from Soakaifs mouth.

Merlin

23 doesn't need to know, this is between us, it goes no further
24 than here.

Then took me over to the detectives section to

25 give him a statement, and he f s putting rae in a room and let mel

176

1 call Robin, and she had told me, does Merlin know anything
2 about it, and I said no.

Then I come back and asked, can I

3 call Merlin now.

No, we got to take you back now so we can

4

get this set up.

I said okay.

5

Q

6

you to talk to your attorney?

7
8

Did you find it strange that they would not want

A

I really didn't know what was happening because

I made a sudden move that I don't think benefited me in any

9 way.
10

Q

Did you think at that time that it did benefit

11 you, somewhat?
12

A

Going to the halfway house to me would have.

13

Q

Were there any other occasions when you were

14 told not to contact your attorney?
15

A

As I was going to Davis County, Lucas and Soakai

16 drove me down"there.

Before we went there, we went to Robin'

17 and picked up the other diamonds.

Come back to Davis County

18 and he said, now, don't call your attorney until after we've
19 made this call, and I didn't see him until Saturday.

And

20 that Saturday we made the call, and then that following
21 Monday, I called Merlin Calver.
22 !

Q

And you, in fact, did follow through with your

23 agreement to testify in the Scott case; is that true?
24

A

Unfortunately, yes.

25

Q

At the time you testified, did you understand

177

1

what consideration you would be getting in your own case?

2

3

A

It had left my mind.

I really should testify or not.

I was thinking on whether
Knowing that if, in fact, I-

4

was found guilty, no matter where I was placed, it would stil!

5

be a problem.

6

It endangers my life.

Q

I knew that.

So at that time, you did have a little more

7

clear understanding of what they actually had offered you;

8

is that true?

9

A

Yes.

10

Q

Did you realize it wasn't to be placed in a

11

halfway house?

12

A

No.

13

Q

You still thought it was to be placed in a

14 halfway house?
15

A

Yes.

16

Q

Hadn't Merlin Calver discussed it wasn't going

17 to be in a halfway house?
18

A

Monday he did.

19

Q

Was that after or before you testified?

20

A

After I testified.

That agreement made

21 I something, that gun enhancement was somewhat okay, and I
22 I had explained to him, hey, they had guaranteed me a halfway
23 |house, what do you mean it isn't nothing.
24 |

Q

But even after talking to Mr. Calver, you went

25 |ahead and testified knowing that the deal as it was on the

178

(c) is armed with a deadly weapon or possesses
or attempts to use any explosive or deadly
weapon.
(2) Aggravated burglary is a first degree felony.
1988

76-6-204. Burglary of a vehicle — Charge of
other offense.
(1) Any person who unlawfully enters any vehicle
with intent to commit a felony or theft is guilty of a
burglary of a vehicle.
(2) Burglary of a vehicle is a class A misdemeanor.
(3) A charge against any person for a violation of
Subsection (1) shall not preclude a charge for a commission of any other offense.
I973
76-6-205.

Manufacture o r p o s s e s s i o n of instrum e n t for burglary o r theft.
Any person who manufactures or possesses any instrument, tool, device, article, or other thing adapted,
designed, or commonly used in advancing or facilitating the commission of any offense under circumstances manifesting an intent to use or knowledge
that some person intends to use the same in the commission of a burglary or theft is guilty of a class B
misdemeanor.
1973
76-6-206. Criminal t r e s p a s s .
(1) For purposes of this section "enter" means intrusion of the entire body.
(2) A person is guilty of criminal trespass if, under
ciitnimstances not amounting to burglary as defined
in Sections 76-6-202, 76-6-203, or 76-6-204:
(a) He enters or remains unlawfully on property and;
(i) Intends to cause annoyance or injury to
any person thereon or damage to any property thereon; or
(ii) Intends to commit any crime, other
than theft or a felony;
(iii) Is reckless as to whether his presence
will cause fear for the safety of another.
(b) Knowing his entry or presence is unlawful,
he enters or remains on property as to which notice against entering is given by:
(i) Personal communication to the actor by
the owner or someone with apparent authority to act for the owner, or
(ii) Fencing or other enclosure obviously
designed to exclude intruders; or
(iii) Posting of signs reasonably likely to
come to the attention of intruders.
(3) A violation of Subsection (2Xa) is a class C
misdemeanor unless it was committed in a dwelling, in which event it is a class B misdemeanor.
A violation of Subsection (2Kb) is an infraction.
(4) It is a defense to prosecution under this section:
(a) That the property was open to the public when the actor entered or remained; and
(b) The actor's conduct did not substantially
interfere with the owner's use of the property.
1974

PART 3
BOBBERY
Section
76-6-301.
76-6-302.
76-6-301.

Robbery.
Aggravated robbery.
Robbery.

(1) Robbery is the unlawful and intentional taking
of personal property in the possession of another from
his person, or immediate presence, against his will,
accomplished by means of force or fear.
(2) Robbery is a felony of the second degree.
1973
76-6-302. A g g r a v a t e d robbery.
(1) A person commits aggravated robbery if in the
course of committing robbery, he:
(a) Uses a firearm or a facsimile of a firearm,
knife or a facsimile of a knife or a deadly weapon;
or
(b) Causes serious bodily injury upon another.
(2) Aggravated robbery is a felony of the first degree.
(3) For the purposes of this part, an act shall be
deemed to be "in the course of committing a robbery"
if it occurs in an attempt to commit, during the commission of, or in the immediate flight after the attempt or commission of a robbery.
1975
PART 4
THEFT
Section
76-6-401.
76-6-402.
76-6-403.
76-6-404.
76-6-405.
76-6-406.
76-6-407.

Definitions.
Presumptions and defenses.
Theft — Evidence to support accusation.
Theft — Elements.
Theft by deception.
Theft by extortion.
Theft of lost, mislaid, or mistakenly delivered property.
76-6-408.
Receiving" stolen property — Duties of
pawnbrokers.
76-6-409.
Theft of services.
76-6-409.1. Devices for theft of services — Seizure
and destruction — Civil actions for
damages.
76-6-409.3. Theft of utility services.
76-6-410.
Theft by person having custody of property pursuant to repair or rental
agreement
76-6-411.
Repealed.
76-6-412.
Theft — Classification of offenses — Action for treble damages against receiver of stolen property.
76-6-401. Definitions.
For the purposes of this part:
(1) "Property* means anything of value, including real estate, tangible and intangible personal property, captured or domestic animals and
birds, written instruments or other writings
representing or embodying rights concerning
real or personal property, labor, services, or otherwise containing anything of value to the
owner, commodities of a public utility nature
such as telecommunications, gas, electricity,
steam, or water, and trade secrets, meaning the
whole or any portion of any scientific or technical
information, design, process, procedure, formula
or invention which the owner thereof intends to
be available only to persons selected by him.
(2) "Obtain" means, in relation to property, to
bring about a transfer of possession or of some
other legally recognized interest in property,
whether to the obtainer or another, in relation to
labor or services, to secure performance thereof;
and in relation to a trade secret, to make any
facsimile, replica, photograph, or other reproduction.

X / I

guilty or no contest and be sentenced or on which bail
may be forfeited. With the magistrate's approval a
person may voluntarily forfeit bail without appearance being required in any case of a class B misdemeanor or less. Such voluntary forfeiture of bail shall
be entered as a conviction and treated the same as if
the accused pleaded guilty.
(2) If the person cited willfully fails to appear before a magistrate pursuant to a citation issued under
Section 77-7-18, or pleads not guilty to the offense
charged, or does not deposit bail on or before the date
set for his appearance, an information shall be filed
and proceedings held in accordance with the Rules of
Criminal Procedure and all other applicable provisions of this code, which information shall be deemed
an original pleading; provided, however, that the person cited may by written agreement waive the filing
of the information and thereafter the prosecution
may proceed on the citation notwithstanding any provisions to the contrary.
i960
77-7-22. Failure to appear as misdemeanor.
Any person who willfully fails to appear before a
court pursuant to a citation issued under the provisions of Section 77-7-18 is guilty of a class B misdemeanor, regardless of the disposition of the charge
upon which he was originally cited.
i9601
77-7-23. Delivery of prisoner arrested without
warrant — Information — Violation as1
misdemeanor.
When an arrest is made without a warrant by aL
peace officer or private person, the person arrestedI
shall, without unnecessary delay, be taken to themagistrate in the precinct of the county or municipality in which the offense occurred, and in information,»
stating the charge against the person shall be made'
before such magistrate. In the event the magistrate off
the precinct is not available, the arrested person shalll
be taken before the available magistrate nearest to>
the scene of the alleged offense. Any officer or personi
violating any of the provisions of this section shall bei
guilty of a class B misdemeanor.
i960)
CHAPTER 8
LINEUPS
Section
77-8-1.
77-8-2.
77-8-3.
77-8-4.

Order of magistrate — Grounds — Arrested suspect's appearance without order.
Suspect's right to have attorney present.
Conduct of peace officer.
Record of proceedings — Access by suspect.

77-8-1. Order of magistrate — Grounds — Arrested suspect's appearance withoutt
order.
(1) A magistrate may issue an order requiring aa
suspect to appear in a lineup when probable causee
exists to believe a crime has been committed andd
there is reason to believe the suspect committed it.lm
(2) A suspect who has been arrested, and is in cus-h
tody, may be required by a peace officer to appear in aa
lineup without a court order.
(3) Upon application of any suspect and a showingg
io
of good cause, a magistrate may order a lineup. i980
77-8-2. Suspect's right to have attorney present.L
A suspect has the right to have his attorney presentit
at any lineup. The magistrate or party in charge of>f
the lineup shall notify the suspect of this right. Everyy

suspect unable to employ counsel shall be entitled to
representation by an attorney appointed by a magistrate for a lineup either before or after an arrest.
1980

77-8-3. Conduct of peace officer.
The peace officers conducting a lineup shall not attempt to influence the identification of any particular
suspect.
i960
77-8-4. Record of proceedings — Access by suspect.
The entire lineup procedure shall be recorded, including all conversations between the witnesses and
the conducting peace officers. The suspect shall have
access to and may make copies of the record and any
photographs taken of him or any other persons in
connection with the lineup.
i960
CHAPTER 9
UNIFORM ACT ON FRESH PURSUIT
Section
77-9-1.
77-9-2.
77-9-3.

Authority of peace officer of another state.
Procedure after arrest
Authority of peace officer of this state beyond normal jurisdiction.

77-9-1. Authority of peace officer of another
state.
A peace officer of another state or the District of
Columbia who enters this state in fresh pursuit and
continues in fresh pursuit of a person in order to arrest him on the ground that he is reasonably believed
to have committed a felony in another state, has the
same authority to arrest and hold a person in custody
as a peace officer of this state. Fresh pursuit does not
require instant action, but pursuit without unreasonable delay.
i960
77-9-2. Procedure after arrest.
An officer who has made an arrest pursuant to Section 77-9-1 shall without unnecessary delay take the
person arrested before a magistrate of the county in
which the arrest was made. The magistrate shall conduct a hearing to determine the lawfulness of the
arrest. If he finds the arrest was lawful, the magistrate may commit the person arrested for a reasonable time or may admit the person to bail pending
extradition proceedings.
i960
77-9-3. Authority of peace officer of this state
beyond normal jurisdiction.
(1) Any peace officer duly authorized by any governmental entity of this state may exercise a peace
officer's authority beyond the limits of such officer's
normal jurisdiction as follows:
(a) When in fresh pursuit of an offender for the
purpose of arresting and holding that person in
custody or returning the suspect to the jurisdiction where the offense was committed;
(b) When a public offense is committed in such
officer's presence;
(c) When participating in an investigation of
criminal activity which originated i n such officer's normal jurisdiction in cooperation w i t h t h e
local authority;
(d) W h e n called to assist peace officers of a n other jurisdiction.
(2) A n y peace officer, prior to t a k i n g such authorized action, shall notify and receive approval of t h e
local l a w enforcement authority, or if such prior contact is not reasonably possible, notify t h e local l a w

fronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor,
and to have the Assistance of counsel for his defence.

AMENDMENTS TO THE
CONSTITUTION
OF THE UNITED STATES

AMENDMENT VII
AMENDMENTS I-X [BILL OF RIGHTS]
AMENDMENTS XI-XXVI

[Trial by jury in civil cases.]
In Suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by
jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by a jury,
shall be otherwise re-examined in any Court of the
United States, than according to the rules of the common law.

AMENDMENT I
[Religious and political freedom.]
Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise
thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the
press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of
grievances.

AMENDMENT V m
[Bail — Punishment.]
Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive
fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments
inflicted.

AMENDMENT U
[Right to bear arms.]
A well-regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep
and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.

AMENDMENT EX
[Rights retained by people.]
The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain
rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage
others retained by the people.

AMENDMENT m
[Quartering soldiers.]
No Soldier shall, in time of peace, be quartered in
any house, without the consent of the Owner, nor in
time of war, but in a manner to be prescribed by law.

AMENDMENT X
[Powers reserved to states or people.]
The powers not delegated to the United States by
the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States,
are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.

AMENDMENT IV
[Unreasonable searches and seizures.]
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and
no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause,
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the persons
or things to be seized

AMENDMENT XI
[Suits against states — Restriction of judicial
power.]
The judicial power of the United States shall not be
construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United
States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or
Subjects of any Foreign State.

AMENDMENT V
[Criminal actions — Provisions concerning —
Due process of law and just compensation
clauses.]
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or
otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment
or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising
in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in
actual service in time of War or public danger; nor
shall any person be subject for the same offence to be
twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against
himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law; nor shall private property
be taken for public use, without just compensation.
AMENDMENT VI
[Rights of accused.]
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy
the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial
jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall
have been committed, which district shall have been
previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of
the nature and cause of the accusation; to be con-

AMENDMENT XH
[Election of President and Vice-President.]
The Electors shall meet in their respective states,
and vote by ballot for President and Vice-President,
one of whom, at least, shall not be an inhabitant of
the same state with themselves; they shall name in
their ballots the person voted for as President, and in
distinct ballots the person voted for as Vice-President, and they shall make distinct lists of all persons
voted for as President, and of all persons voted for as
Vice-President, and of the number of votes for each,
which lists they shall sign and certify, and transmit
sealed to the seat of the Government of the United
States, directed to the President of the Senate;—The
President of the Senate shall, in the presence of the
Senate and House of Representatives, open all the
certificates and the votes shall then be counted;—-The
person having the greatest number of votes for President, shall be the President, if such number be a majority of the whole number of Electors appointed; and
if no person have such majority, then from the persons having the highest numbers not exceeding three
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on the list of those voted for as President, the House
of Representatives shall choose immediately, by ballot, the President. But in choosing the President, the
votes shall be taken by states, the representation
from each state having one vote; a quorum for this
purpose shall consist of a member or members from
two-thirds of the states, and a majority of all the
states shall be necessary to a choice. And if the House
of Representatives shall not choose a President whenever the right of choice shall devolve upon them, before the fourth day of March next following, then the
Vice-President shall act as President, as in the case of
the death or other constitutional disability of the
President.—The person having the greatest number
of votes as Vice-President, shall be the Vice-President, if such number be a majority of the whole number of Electors appointed, and if no person have a
majority, then from the two highest numbers on the
list, the Senate shall choose the Vice-President; a
quorum for the purpose shall consist of two-thirds of
the whole number of Senators, and a majority of the
whole number shall be necessary to a choice. But no
person constitutionally ineligible to the office of President shall be eligible to that of Vice-President of the
United States.
AMENDMENT XIII
Section
1. [Slavery prohibited.]
2. [Power to enforce amendment.]
Section 1.
Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except
as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall
have been duly convicted, shall exist within the
United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction.
Sec. 2. [Power to enforce amendment]
Congress shall have power to enforce this article by
appropriate legislation.
AMENDMENT XIV
Section
1. [Citizenship — Due process of law — Equal protection.]
2. [Representatives — Power to reduce appointment.]
3. [Disqualification to hold office.]
4. [Public debt not to be questioned — Debts of the
Confederacy and claims not to be
paid.]
5. [Power to enforce amendment]
Section 1. [Citizenship — Due process of law —
Equal protection.]
All persons born or naturalized in the United
States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein
they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law
which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of
citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law; nor deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
S e c 2. [Representatives — Power to reduce appointment]
Representatives shall be apportioned among the
several States according to their respective numbers,
counting the whole number of persons in each State,
excluding Indians not taxed. But when the right to

vote at any election for the choice of electors for President and Vice-President of the United States, Representatives in Congress, the Executive and Judicial
Officers of a State, or the members of the Legislature
thereof, is denied to any of the male inhabitants of
such State, being twenty-one years of age, and citizens of the United States, or in any way abridged,
except for participation in rebellion, or other crime,
the basis of representation therein shall be reduced in
the proportion which the number of such male citizens shall bear to the whole number of male citizens
twenty-one years of age in such State.
Sec. 3. [Disqualification to hold office.]
No person shall be a Senator or Representative in
Congress, or Elector of President and Vice President,
or hold any office, civil or military, under the United
States, or under any State, who, having previously
taken an oath, as a member of Congress, or as an
officer of the United States, or as a member of any
State legislature, or as an executive or judicial officer
of any State, to support the Constitution of the
United States, shall have engaged in insurrection or
rebellion against the same, or given aid or comfort to
the enemies thereof. But Congress may by a vote of
two-thirds of each House, remove such disability.
Sec. 4. [Public debt not to be questioned —
Debts of the Confederacy and claims
not to be paid.]
The validity of the public debt of the United States,
authorized by law, including debts incurred for payment of pensions and Bounties for services in suppressing insurrection or rebellion, shall not be questioned But neither the United States nor any State
shall assume or pay any debt or obligation incurred
in aid of insurrection or rebellion against the United
States, or any claim for the loss or emancipation of
any slave; but all such debts, obligations, and claims
shall be held illegal and void.
Sec. 5. [Power to enforce amendment]
The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article.
AMENDMENT XV
Section
1. [Right of citizens to vote — Race or color not to
disqualify.]
2. [Power to enforce amendment.]
Section 1. [Right of citizens to vote — Race or
color not to disqualify.]
The right of citizens of the United States to vote
shall not be denied or abridged by the United States
or by any State on account of race, color, or previous
condition of servitude.
S e c 2. [Power to enforce amendment.]
The Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation.
AMENDMENT XVI
[Income tax.]
The Congress shall have power to lay and collect
taxes on incomes, from whatever source derived,
without apportionment among the several States,
and without regard to any census or enumeration.

